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1 Introduction
Johannes Peter Mu¨ller (1801–1858) was the most influential physiologist of the first half of the 19th
century, due both to his original contributions, especially in the areas of reflex action, sensation, and
comparative embryology, and to his textbook, Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen (1833–40). The
single idea most strongly associated with Mu¨ller is the “Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies,” articulated
in Book V of his Handbuch in 1840.1 The fundamental idea behind the Doctrine is that the direct objects
of sensation are the activities of sensory nerves, not qualities external to the body. This Doctrine serves
as a foundational principle in both the neurophysiology of sensation and the psychology of perception;
historians have identified it as a precondition for the “visual culture of modernity” (Crary 1990); and it has
had profound influence in philosophy, providing the crucial link between Herbart’s realist interpretation
of Kant and the “operationalized” Kantianism of Helmholtz (Hatfield 1990; Lenoir 2006), as well as
motivating the epistemology of a number of late 19th century neo-Kantians, including Liebmann and
Lange (Edgar 2015). The shadow cast by Helmholtz across the early 20th century ramified the influence
of the Doctrine into the philosophy of science, where its structuralist implications echoed through the
work of Hertz, Schlick, Cassirer, and beyond.
In the science of perception, the importance of the Doctrine cannot be overstated. Although there
are questions of priority about its tenets, it was given its fundamental codification by Mu¨ller. Boring
(1950) argues that Helmholtz’s theories of hearing and vision, Hering’s theory of vision, and theories of
“sensory spots in the skin” all depend critically on Mu¨ller’s theory as they “were suggested explicitly by
[it]” (81–2). In fact, a survey of Boring (1942) makes clear that far more of the science of perception
than just these particular theories rests upon the Doctrine, as it motivated specific research programs
on all aspects of sensation, as well as heralding the shift toward the study of localized sensory centers
in the brain (1942, 72ff, 610; 1950, 88–9). The Doctrine continues to be cited in standard textbooks on
perception (e.g. Goldstein 2006) and to appear in contemporary research papers as both a fundamental
principle and an object of continued empirical support (e.g. Namer and Reeh 2013; Nadel et al. 2012).
Nevertheless, the Doctrine has also been sharply criticized, and its philosophical significance contested.
Although heavily influenced by the Doctrine, Cassirer also lampooned the way Helmholtz’s adherence to it
1An early version appears in Mu¨ller’s 1826 monograph on the comparative anatomy of vision in animals and humans
(44–55). The common German name is “Gesetz der spezifischen Sinnesenergien”; in English, sometimes the term “law” is
used rather than “doctrine” and/or “sense” rather than “nerve”—I follow the older English nomenclature here.
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rendered his theory of “the a priori . . . a mere extension of a certain individual result of natural science”
(1912, 96; c.f. Patton 2009, 284). Psychologist J. W. Bridges (1912) criticized the phenomenological
support for the Doctrine and argued it contradicts our understanding of the evolution of sensory organs.
J. J. Gibson (1966) had even harsher words for the Doctrine, implying even in his arrangement of
epigraphs that he considered it false (xv). For Gibson, Mu¨ller illegitimately emphasizes an atypical case,
of marginal importance in the study of perception:
We may sometimes be “aware of the state of a nerve,” as Mu¨ller put it, but we are more likely
to be aware of patterns and transformations of input that specify the causes of arousal quite
independently of the specific nerves that are firing. (Gibson 1966, p. 38)
As we shall see, Mu¨ller’s own understanding of the Doctrine was far more congenial to Gibson’s approach
than Gibson himself realized.2
The aim of these papers is to explicate the conceptual origins of the Doctrine in Mu¨ller and Helmholtz
and to argue for its continued significance today. Part I analyzes Mu¨ller’s argument for the Doctrine as it
appears in its most influential statement, as well as his own assessment of its philosophical significance. I
argue that some tenets of the Doctrine merely summarize data while others constitute substantive theoret-
ical conclusions. These conclusions follow from the data only on the assumption of certain methodological
principles. It is these methodological principles then that constitute the implicit heart of the Doctrine.
Part II demonstrates the perseverance and entrenchment of these principles in Helmholtz and beyond to
the contemporary science of perception, and argues that the Doctrine has substantive implications for
today’s naturalistic philosophy of perception and the history of philosophy of science.
Fortunately, the Doctrine does not, as some critics have worried, necessarily imply idealism or skepti-
cism.3 Mu¨ller himself endorsed a form of indirect realism, best described as structural realism. Epistemic
structural realism denies us direct epistemic access to the natures, or essences, of objects and properties
in the world; nevertheless, we can still achieve knowledge of the structural relations that obtain between
them. The Doctrine’s claim that the direct objects of perception are just internal states of the sensory
nerves does not motivate a thoroughgoing anti-realism unless paired with some further empiricist prin-
ciple, for instance that sensation is the sole source of knowledge. Mu¨ller himself endorsed the view that
knowledge derives from our innate capacity to abstract general principles from patterns in experience.
Thus, although the qualities of our sensations do not reveal to us the essential natures of external objects,
the principles we abstract from regularities in these sensations do constitute knowledge of the structural
relationships and interactions between external objects and properties. Mu¨ller’s position here is informed
by his analysis of the nature of scientific knowledge. Just as Newton was able to derive quantitative laws
about the behavior of gravity without “feigning hypotheses” about its nature, the sciences of electricity,
light, and heat also in Mu¨ller’s day developed scientific laws without definitive theories of the underlying
nature of the “energies” they concerned. So also the position of the physiologist towards the nervous
energy—he may derive rules about its behavior while remaining forever ignorant of its essential nature;
so also our epistemic access to external bodies—we may gain knowledge about their behavior, even as
their essential natures remain forever hidden from us.
I begin with a discussion of Mu¨ller’s theory of knowledge. This is because, unlike Cassirer’s Helmholtz,
Mu¨ller’s philosophy does not derive solely from his physiology, but rather his physiology is informed by his
2Other critics include Lotze (Woodward 1975), Weber (Boring 1950, p. 89), and Ko¨hler (e.g. 1947, Ch. 3).
3An interpretation embraced even by some of its supporters, e.g. the neo-Kantian Liebmann (Edgar 2015).
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philosophy.4 I then examine Mu¨ller’s statement of, and argument for, the Doctrine in detail, emphasizing
the methodological presuppositions he employs to turn undirected experimentation into a focussed science
of perception. I conclude by briefly foreshadowing Part II, and the open questions still to be addressed
if the Doctrine is to have significance for science and philosophy today.
2 Mu¨ller’s Epistemology
Mu¨ller begins Book VI of the Handbuch, “On the Mind,” with a discussion of his general philosophical
views on the nature of mind, life, and the cosmos, developing a theory of knowledge that, by his lights,
treads a middle path between Hume and Kant. The crucial issue here is the origin of concepts (“Begriffe”)
and their relationship to ideas, or representations (“Vorstellungen”). With Hume, Mu¨ller endorses a
picture on which sensations generate simple ideas, and these ideas become connected through associations,
resting primitively on a relation of resemblance (2:519/1347, cf. 2:523/1351).5 However, with Kant, Mu¨ller
argues the abstract concepts we de facto posses indicate a richer innate capacity than Hume allows, as
they could not possibly arise through mere association or habit (2:519/1348). After outlining Mu¨ller’s
positive theory, it will be helpful to contrast it with that of post-Kantian psychologist Johann Friedrich
Herbart’s Lehrbuch zur Psychologie (1816/1834, 2nd ed.). Mu¨ller explicitly cites the Lehrbuch’s account
of concept formation, and there are illuminating similarities and differences between the two theories.
Although he recognizes the need for some innate source of concepts beyond mere association or
habit, Mu¨ller rejects Kant’s theory of a rich set of a priori concepts (“Verstandesbegriffe”: concepts
of the understanding) qualitatively distinguished from other ideas. Grouping Kant here with Aristotle,
to whom he ascribes a notion of innate categories, Mu¨ller argues that only a single innate capacity is
required to generate the elements on both their lists of supposed a priori concepts. He introduces this
capacity through a discussion of the inadequacy of habit for forming an abstract notion of causality:
[T]he human mind . . . would never derive from the mere experience afforded by the senses,
and from habit, the general abstract concept of causality, unless it had a certain power of
abstraction [Vermo¨gen der Abstraction],—a power namely, of forming a mental something
out of the returning combinations of two things, of which one requires the succession of the
other. (2:519/1347–8*)
While rejecting Hume’s reliance on mere habit, Mu¨ller nevertheless considers all knowledge to have
some root in experience. This is why the various categories of Kant and Aristotle are not truly innate.6
Nevertheless, with the addition to experience of the human faculty of abstraction, these same fundamental
categories can be derived.
I do not [accept] that the mind is originally occupied by the concepts of the understanding of
Kant, or the categories of Aristotle; these appear to be the fruit of experience and of the power
of abstraction. But the original power by which the different categories are first acquired, from
4Mu¨ller 1826 insists on the “need” for a “philosophical perspective” in physiology, 1–36; c.f. Lenoir 1982, 105–111.
5All references to Mu¨ller’s Handbuch give volume number, then page in the German edition followed by page in the
1842 English edition. Wherever possible, I give Baly’s translation. When it has been necessary to change the translation
(typically in order to maintain consistency in technical terms), the page number is marked with an asterix.
6Of course, Mu¨ller may be misinterpreting Kant and Aristotle in ascribing to them the view that their respective
categories are innate.
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the observation of external nature, is the faculty of extracting the general property from many
specialities or separate perceptions, in other words the power of forming a concept, λόγος.
(2:519/1348*)
This power of abstraction distinguishes humans from animals, and is the fundamental source of all
knowledge (2:523–5/1351–3).
The distinctive character of Kant’s concepts of the understanding for Mu¨ller is not their innateness,
but their generality. Concepts such as quality, change, infinity, finitude, causality, space, and time are
abstracted from many distinct ideas, and thus capture that which is common across all of them. In
virtue of this generality, they constrain (“binden”) thought, guiding our reasoning about the world. Such
binding concepts may appear to constitute innate constraints on thought (i.e. fundamental categories,
or concepts of the understanding) in virtue of their broad applicability. Nevertheless, mere reflection on
those concepts that appear extremely general will never produce more than an arbitrary list (hence the
difference between the lists of Kant and Aristotle). By positing a single process by which all abstract
concepts are generated, Mu¨ller avoids this problem.
However, Mu¨ller must also avoid another of his own criticisms of the innate concept strategy of Kant
and Aristotle for grounding epistemology. He argues that the mere positing of innate structure does not
provide a satisfying solution to the problem of knowledge of the external world. The reason is that this
strategy appears to rest on the assumption of a “pre-established harmony between the world of phenomena
. . . and the mind” (2:517/1346). Only an assumption of such pre-established harmony could justify the
conclusion that innate concepts indeed correspond to true categories in the world. Yet positing a single
innate capacity for concept formation does not at first seem to avoid this problem. What guarantees that
Mu¨ller’s abstracted concepts constitute correct descriptions of the categorical structure of the world? Is
not the correspondence between such abstracted concepts and the world just as mysterious for Mu¨ller as
for Kant and Aristotle?
Mu¨ller avoids this worry because his power of abstraction does not add anything to the simple ideas
derived from sensation and their relations. It is not a “special power” (“besonderes Vermo¨gen”) in the
sense of a distinct, function-specific ability; it is rather a general capacity for allowing concepts to emerge
from the structural interactions between ideas.
The faculty of concept formation is not, however, a special power of the mind acting on the
ideas; but it consists in the mutual reaction of related ideas amongst themselves. The human
capacity for ideas has such a degree of development that many distinct perceptions or simple
ideas may exist in it simultaneously, and react on each other. If many related ideas are present,
which in one respect differ, while in another they agree, the points of difference amongst the
mass of ideas become obscured [verdunkelt ], while only that which the different ideas have in
common remains distinct. . . . The more general is the application of these concepts, the more
binding they are for the intellect, once they are experienced. (2:520/1348*)
It is the uniquely human ability to entertain multiple ideas simultaneously that allows the process of
abstraction to occur. But this process is not active, it does not add anything to these simple ideas, it
merely allows those features on which they differ to fade away (“verdunkelt”). The remainder is just the
more abstract concept that captures their points of similarity, and in so doing, constrains thought just as
do Kant’s concepts of the understanding. Since the features of this abstract concept were already present
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in the simpler ideas derived from experience, however, its correspondence to the world is not the result
of pre-established harmony. Rather, it constitutes knowledge of the world in that it was derived wholely
from structural relations between sensations of the world.7
Mu¨ller’s discussion here owes much to the chapter “On the Formation of Concepts” in Herbart’s
Lehrbuch zur Psychologie, which he cites. Herbart (1776–1841) developed an empirical approach to psy-
chology in tandem with a realist interpretation of Kant, thereby providing an avenue for Kantian influence
in German psychology that continued throughout the 19th century. In contrast to the post-Kantian ide-
alists, Herbart accepted the reality of things in themselves, and argued that a correspondence between
conception and reality could be achieved through a program of refining and reworking philosophical
concepts (Hatfield 1990, pp. 118–9). In his psychology, Kant’s forms of intuition and concepts of the
understanding were transformed into objects of empirical investigation (Lenoir 2006).
While they both aim to provide an empirical corrective to Kant, there are fundamental differences
between Mu¨ller’s and Herbart’s accounts of concept formation. Like Mu¨ller, Herbart criticizes Kant for
the “delusion” that concepts constitute a distinguished class amongst ideas (§180).8 For Herbart, concepts
in the strict logical sense are not actually achievable in human cognition, but may only be approached as
an “ideal” (“Ideal,” §78; §180). Consequently, whereas in logic we take concepts to be more fundamental
than judgments (“Urtheil”), in psychology, judgments should be taken as more fundamental:
[H]uman thought very often . . . assumes the form of judgments. The combination of a subject
and predicate lies at the foundation of nearly all forms of speech in the languages of civilized
peoples. It must not be forgotten, however, that the logical demand that the subject and
predicate shall be clearly defined concepts, is not complied with in actual usage. (§80*)
It is by means of such judgements that concepts are approached in thought.
In fact, Herbart vehemently denies the existence of a faculty of abstraction (“Abstractionvermo¨gen”)
capable of separating the similar from the dissimilar aspects of ideas, arguing such a faculty is not only
a “fantasy” but an “impossibility” (“Unmo¨glichkeit”). The reason is that, for Herbart, simple qualities
themselves are indivisible, and once simple qualities have been blended into an idea, they cannot then be
separated (§180). Nevertheless, Herbart agrees with Mu¨ller that concepts are distinguished from simple
ideas in virtue of their abstraction, that the ability to produce such abstractions is the dividing line
between animalistic and intelligent thought (§64), and that those ideas which approach concepts are
7I believe the most consistent interpretation of Mu¨ller treats this process of extracting commonalities to generate general
constraints on thought as applying also to his understanding of Kant’s forms of intuition, i.e. space and time. This contrasts
with the reading of Lenoir (1993, p. 114), who interprets Mu¨ller as completely endorsing Kant’s theory of space as a form
of intuition (“Anschauungsform”). Mu¨ller does indeed claim that newborn animals have intuitions of spatial juxtaposition
(“Anschauungen vom ra¨umlichen Nebeneinander,” 2:558/1387), and refers to an innate ability to perceive spatial forms
by fundamental intuition (“Grundanschauungen,” 2:362/1176) in his discussion of the Molyneux / Locke problem: will a
person blind from birth, familiar with triangles and circles as sensed via touch, be able to distinguish triangles and circles
via vision if suddenly granted the ability to see? Mu¨ller answers in the affirmative since “the senses of touch and sight are
both based on the same fundamental intuition by which we are rendered conscious of the extension of our own organs in
space” (2:362/1176*). However, Mu¨ller also places space and time on his list of fundamental concepts derived through the
power of abstraction (2:520/1349). On my reading, what is innate is the effect of the spatial arrangement of nerves in the
retina and nerves on the surface of the skin—in both cases, these convey spatiality to sensation. However, our abstract
knowledge of spatial relations in the world depends crucially on the application of the power of abstraction across these
two sensory modalities, hence the disagreement with Kant and the notion of space and time as derived concepts (c.f. the
discussion of Law VIII below and Hatfield 1990, 155–6).
8I cite Herbart’s Lehrbuch by section number. Wherever possible I follow the translation of Smith; amended translations
are marked with an asterix.
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somehow derived from their particular instantiations in simpler ideas. The question then arises to what
extent their disagreement is merely terminological.
Herbart and Mu¨ller both use the evocative term “verdunkeln” (occluding, darkening, or obscuring)
to characterize the effect of the concept formation process on the differences between simpler mental
entities. They differ, however, on the details of this obfuscating mechanism.
[C]ertain total impressions [Gesammteindrucke] of similar objects are presupposed as raw
material from which general concepts are gradually constructed. These total impressions are,
however, nothing but complexes in which the similar characteristics of the partial ideas have
a preponderance over the different characteristics. Such excess becomes gradually stronger
and more decisive. At first the repeated apprehensions of similar objects form a time series
[Zeitreihe] . . . the frequently recurring becomes a persistent, the idea of which now remains in
a condition of involution. The inhibition [Hemmung ] amongst the differing determinations9
has thereby transformed into a permanent obscuration [dauerende Verdunkelung ] of them,
although they are not completely separated from the similar ones. (§180*)
Herbart’s mechanism of concept formation, like Mu¨ller’s, involves the interaction of simpler entities, the
obscuring of their differences, and the persistence of their similarities. The simpler entities involved here
are not mere perceptions or ideas, however, but sequences of such (“Reihe,” or series). These series are
not bound into single ideas, and so their similarities and differences are free to interact. For Herbart,
ideas are like forces, which vie for a place in consciousness (§10–§12). Ideas which differ inhibit or resist
(“Hemmung”) each other (§14). Only by the fading of their differences, then, can this inhibition be
mitigated, and multiple ideas become entangled together into a more general one.
The two views exhibit four points of apparent contrast: (i) status of the faculty of abstraction; (ii)
the fundamental entities involved in concept formation; (iii) their arrangement in the mind; and (iv)
the end products of concept formation. The first two points can be reduced to mere terminological
differences; the latter two, however, constitute substantive disagreements. First, Herbart’s rejection of an
Abstractionvermo¨gen is a rejection of a special faculty, since he rejects the positing of faculties in general
(§58, §120; c.f. Hatfield 1990, 122). Emphasizing that concepts are formed through judgments is not for
him an endorsement of a faculty of judgment, but rather an emphasis on the generality of the process.
This is essentially the same point Mu¨ller makes when he emphasizes that his Vermo¨gen of abstraction is
not a “besonderes Vermo¨gen,” i.e. not a special power or faculty of the mind.
Herbart’s claim that it is not simple ideas but series of total impressions which serve as the starting
point for concept formation seems largely consistent with Mu¨ller’s view. At least in the particular case
Mu¨ller discusses of the concept of causality, it is “the returning combinations of two things, of which
one requires the succession of the other” (2:519/1348) that form the basis for abstraction. So causality
is derived from a complex structure with parts arranged in sequence much like Herbart’s series. In
general, Mu¨ller must not intend the starting point of concept formation to be ideas so simple as to have
no component parts (e.g. bare color patches), as only if the ideas are rich enough to have multiple
characteristics can some of these be the same and some different across multiple ideas. Something like
9Bestimmungen—I follow here the suggested translation of Ferreiro´s (1999). “Bestimmung” is a technical term for
Herbart, referring to particular, or determinate, instantiations of a more general manifold of possibilities, for instance an
instantiation of a particular color. We can empirically investigate the structure of the manifold of color by following a series
(“Reihe”) of these determinations, such as that from red, through orange, to yellow (§75, §190; Isaac 2013).
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Herbart’s total impressions, or combinations of such, then seems charitable as an interpretation of Mu¨ller’s
ideas.
However, the arrangement of ideas in the mind which induces concept formation appears to be different
in the two theories. For Herbart, simultaneously presented ideas that differ inhibit each other, thus
resulting in a state of (near) equilibrium, with both ideas obscured, and neither rising to the threshold
of consciousness (“Schwelle des Bewusstseins”: §13–§16). Perhaps to ensure consistency with this aspect
of his view, ideas which approach concepts are formed from the sequential presentation of complexes of
ideas. This diachronic theory of concept formation contrasts sharply with Mu¨ller’s synchronic story, in
which the simultaneous presence of multiple ideas in the mind is precisely what initiates the process of
obscuration of their differences.
The final, and most striking divergence is the status of the ideas which result from these processes.
Herbart insists that they are mere ideas, which only approach concepts as ideals, while Mu¨ller seems
to countenance them as full-fledged concepts. The difference is revealed in their differing criticisms of
Kant: for Mu¨ller, it is merely the innateness of concepts which is in error, while for Herbart, the status
of concepts as mental objects at all constitutes a confusion. A related point here is just what each means
by “verdunkeln”: Herbart emphasizes that, although the differences between complexes are obscured
permanently, nevertheless they remain attached to the similarities that constitute the more general idea,
implying that obscuration is never complete. Mu¨ller, in endorsing the view that the results of this process
are true concepts, and furthermore that they have the power to constrain thought, seems to endorse a
more thorough notion of obscuration. If features previously obscured during concept formation continued
to play any functional role, it seems that should impede the application of concepts to new ideas that
contrast with them, yet this would undermine the constraining power of concepts on thought.
Despite these differences, Mu¨ller and Herbart reach essentially the same epistemological conclusion:
knowledge of the world is possible through concepts that, though distilled through distinctively human
abilities (whether abstraction or judgment), nevertheless are determined structurally by the world and
thus correspond to it. Mu¨ller’s understanding of this process and his epistemological commitments will
turn out to be essential for understanding his realist interpretation of the Doctrine of Specific Nerve
Energies.
3 The Doctrine and its Defense
Mu¨ller’s statement of the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies in the first section of Book V of the Hand-
buch, “On the Senses,” is divided into ten “Grundsa¨tze”: fundamental principles or laws. These laws fall
into three basic categories: (i) inductive generalizations (I–IV, VI, VII); (ii) theoretical conclusions (V,
VIII); and (iii) conjectures (IX, X). Each law is defended with an argument. Inductive generalizations
are supported by experimental results, while theoretical conclusions about the nature of perception are
derived by combining these generalizations with substantive methodological presuppositions. The con-
jectures are effectively “just so” stories that bridge the gap between the counterintuitive conclusions of
Laws I–VIII and familiar perceptual phenomena. Below, I examine the laws using this taxonomy. The
goal is to uncover the presuppositions that motivate Mu¨ller’s central conclusion: we only perceive directly
the activity of our nerves; nevertheless, we can have knowledge of the world.
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3.1 Inductive Generalizations
The six inductive generalizations are susceptible to two forms of criticism: the experiments themselves
may be questioned, or the manner in which they are interpreted and summarized. I will focus on the
latter problem.10 While Mu¨ller does employ some contentious assumptions in his interpretation of the
data, I argue that these do not substantively affect the conclusions of the Doctrine.
I. [E]xternal agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by
internal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves. (2:250/1059)
II. The same internal cause excites in the different senses different sensations;—in each case
the sensations peculiar to it. (2:251/1061)
By “internal” here, Mu¨ller means causes inside the boundary of the body. For instance, we may feel
sensations of heat, pain, or cold within the belly, demonstrating that sensations of touch can be produced
by internal causes. He counts flashes and sensations of color when the eyes are closed amongst such cases,
as well as ringing in the ears and spontaneous sensations of smell.11 In defense of Law II, Mu¨ller gives
the example of “the accumulation of blood in the capillary vessels of the nerve,” i.e. inflammation, which
excites in the retina flashes of light, in the ear ringing and humming, and so on for the other senses, as
well as the example of the introduction of narcotics into the blood, which, from a single cause, excites
sparks before the eyes, ringing in the ears, etc.12
III. The same external cause also gives rise to different sensations in each sense, according to
the special endowments of its nerve. (2:251/1061)
IV. The peculiar sensations of each nerve of sense can be excited by several distinct causes
internal and external. (2:253/1064)
Together Laws III and IV describe a “double dissociation” between external cause and sensory effect,
i.e. the same cause can produce different effects, while different causes can produce the same (type of)
effect. Under III, Mu¨ller discusses three types of external cause: mechanical, electrical, and chemical.
Mechanically, pressing on the eye produces sensations of color, while hitting the ear produces a ringing
sensation. Electricity is an important example for Mu¨ller as it can stimulate all five of the senses differ-
entially, and he discusses sensations induced by both Voltaic piles and electrostatic devices. Chemical
agents (e.g. acids or alkalis) can induce tastes when applied to the tongue, smells when applied to the
nose, and sensations of burning, pain, and heat in the body-wide organ of touch. Mu¨ller notes the effects
of direct contact with the eyes and ears cannot safely be studied, but includes chemical substances intro-
duced into the blood (e.g. narcotics) as a related case. Under Law IV, Mu¨ller relists experiments already
mentioned, only this time reorganized by stimulated organ / type of sensation, rather than by cause.
10There is also room for criticisms of the former sort. Woodward (1975), for instance, argues that Mu¨ller was unduly
precipitous in his rejection of Magendie’s experimental data, e.g. on whether nerves of multiple sensory modalities can
induce sensations of pain, attributing this rejection to Mu¨ller’s pre-theoretical commitments. In my view, the experiments
at issue constitute a small enough portion of Mu¨ller’s overall evidence that they do not, as Woodward claims, “falsify and
refute the Mu¨ller doctrine” (147).
11cf. Mu¨ller’s discussion of phantom pains in missing limbs and sensations caused by brain stimulation in other parts of
the Handbuch, including Law VII.
12Mu¨ller discusses the effects of narcotics on nerves more generally at 1:632–638/625–631, emphasizing in particular their
different effects when introduced into the blood and when in direct contact with nerve fibers, 1:634–637/627–630.
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The double dissociation between cause and sensation is the empirical heart of the Doctrine of Specific
Nerve Energies. How plausible is it as an interpretation of the data Mu¨ller presents? The direction
from same cause to multiple sensations is much more secure than the direction from multiple causes to
same type of sensation. This is because the individuation and categorization of cause types is relatively
uncontroversial. If wires from a Voltaic pile are applied to one’s eye, then those same wires are applied
to one’s ear, and in the first case one sees a flash and in the second hears a ringing, there seems little
doubt that the same cause produced those distinct sensations.
However, the question of how to individuate and categorize sensations is more contentious—at issue
here is how to identify sensations of the same type, and whether there is indeed a determinate type
peculiar to or characteristic of (“eigenthu¨mlich”) each sense organ. For example, the taste sensation
induced by an electric current is quite unusual. Arguably, it is not very like taste sensations produced
in the standard chemical way, e.g. the taste of chocolate cake. Perhaps all that unites them is that the
tongue was stimulated—what legitimates the move from the claim that electrical current generates this
particular taste to the claim that tastes in general may be caused by different types of stimuli? It appears
at first as if Mu¨ller’s reliance on the traditional classification of the senses into five is absolutely critical
for this argument. So long as we countenance the battery taste and the chocolate cake taste as both
tastes, the two together show that in principle tastes may be caused by heterogeneous stimuli. However,
the fact that the tongue is stimulated in both cases is not enough to demonstrate that these sensations
fall into the same category, as a strict correspondence between sensation type and sensory organ is part
of what Mu¨ller needs to show. In fact, some of Mu¨ller’s examples here seem extremely questionable;
he claims, for instance, that the ability to stimulate a feeling of nausea with a finger in the back of the
throat demonstrates that taste sensations may be induced by mechanical causes. Yet it is not obvious
that nausea should be classified within a single sensory modality, nor if it were, that that modality should
be taste.
This is one of the criticisms of Bridges (1912):
It seems introspectively untrue that adequate and inadequate stimuli produce sensations that
are essentially the same in character. There is always a quality or feeling associated with
sensations produced by the latter, by which they can clearly be distinguished from sensations
produced by the former. We are never deceived in this respect; and it certainly rests with the
advocates of the doctrine to explain why this is so. (61)
“Adequate” stimuli are just those which typically stimulate a sense organ. Bridges’ claim is that the taste
of the battery is not qualitatively similar to tastes induced by foodstuffs; the colors seen when pressing
on the eye are not qualitatively similar to typical visual sensations; the ringing in the ears resulting from
a blow to the head is not qualitatively like typical sound experiences; etc. If we can always identify the
sensations caused by “inadequate” (atypical) stimuli, then they do not seem to fall into natural categories
with sensations induced by typical stimuli.
This line of objection is important, and I address it in depth in Part II. To foreshadow the discussion
there, note three points. First, Bridges’ insistence that we are “never deceived” by atypical stimuli is
not obviously correct. In some cases, at least, we are arguably confused by atypical stimuli: a ringing
in the ears may be mistaken for an external humming or a chemical burn on the skin may be mistaken
for a burn due to heat. Second, significant support for grouping sensations due to inadequate stimuli
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with typical ones is found in our ability to make comparisons between the two, employing a single
vocabulary. I can note that a sensation induced by pressure on my eyeball is “purple” showing some
standard of comparison with purple sensations due to light. This principle of comparability (if sensations
can be compared, they fall in the same modality) was already present in Herbart, and is the foundational
assumption of psychophysical measurement.
Finally, Mu¨ller elsewhere states as a methodological principle that each nerve should be assumed to
project to a single point in the brain, and correspondingly should be associated with a single effect. If
this unitary correspondence principle is assumed, then the fact that the very same nerve can be excited
by both an electrical current and chocolate cake is enough to group whatever sensations result together.
The motivation for and legitimacy of this principle is discussed in Part II. Here, simply note that the
argument from this principle is not circular in the way an appeal to sensory organs would be. The claim
is not that the taste of chocolate cake and that of a battery should be grouped together because the same
organ is stimulated, but rather because the exact same nerve is excited.
VI. The nerve of each sense seems to be capable of one determinate kind of sensation only,
and not of those proper to the other organs of sense; hence one nerve of sense cannot take the
place and perform the function of the nerve of another sense. (2:258/1069)
Mu¨ller notes that sensations due to a particular sense organ may vary in their degree of intensity,
as well as in their degree of pleasantness or discomfort, without the qualitative nature of the sensation
being altered, i.e. “even in the most excited condition of an organ of sense, the sensation preserves its
specific character” (2:258/1069). A challenge here is the question of pain. Mu¨ller’s strict adherence to
five modalities forces him to classify pain as a sensation of touch, and he thus spends some time refuting
claims that nerves of other modalities can induce sensations of pain (cf. Footnote 10); his strategy is to
point out that nerves of touch are typically present either in, or in close proximity to, all sense organs.
Much of this discussion involves specific vivisection experiments where animal sensory nerves were laid
bare and stimulated in various ways.
While Mu¨ller’s defense of Law VI again appears to rely heavily on his adherence to a strict classi-
fication of senses into the traditional five, subsequent developments demonstrate this assumption to be
irrelevant to the Doctrine’s fundamental conclusions. In particular, Mu¨ller’s grouping of sensory qualities
by modality was quickly replaced by an individuation of sensory qualities within a modality, and an
antribution of these to distinct nerve types (a reform associated with Helmholtz, but first proposed as
early as 1844 by Natanson, Boring 1950, pp. 91–4). On this view, color vision involves three distinct
nerve types, with their own corresponding primitive sensations; audition more than four thousand types
of nerve cell, each with a distinct sensory quality (Helmholtz 1954 [1862], p. 147); and touch distinct
nerves for qualities of pressure, pain, heat, and cold. The perseverance of the central methodological and
epistemological conclusions of the Doctrine across this reformation demonstrates again that the critical
assumption is really the unitary correspondence principle.
VII. It is not known whether the essential cause of the peculiar “energy” of each nerve of
sense is seated in the nerve itself, or in the parts of the brain and spinal cord with which it is
connected; but it is certain that the central portions of the nerves included in the encephalon
are susceptible of their peculiar sensations, independently of the more peripheral portion of
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the nervous cords which form the means of communication with the external organs of sense.
(2:261/1072)
Law VII is essentially a statement of ignorance: we don’t know if it is the nerve itself or its locus of
projection in the brain that determines sensory quality. It is particularly interesting from a historical
standpoint, as those who have interpreted the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies solely on the basis
of its name have thought it to be in conflict with our contemporary information-processing view of the
nervous system. On current views, it is not any particular quality in nerves themselves, but their wiring
that determines their effects. Yet it is precisely this possibility which Mu¨ller entertains here: that it is
the points of projection in the brain which determine sensory quality, not the nerves themselves.
In fact, all the evidence given under VII supports the possibility that it is the locus of projection in
the brain, not the peripheral nerve fiber, which determines sensory quality. Mu¨ller discusses instances
where brain stimulation has produced sensory experience and an example of a patient who experienced
phantom visions after his eye had been removed. He also references his earlier discussion of the general
principles of the propagation of activity in sensory nerves (1:695/686f ). A sequence of experimental results
demonstrates that it is “a matter of indifference whether the stimulus be applied to . . . the nervous trunk;
in the branches . . . ; or in the peripheral parts” (1:700/690). These considerations lead him inexorably
to the conclusion that
The primitive fibres of a nerve, whether long or short, would appear, therefore, to represent
each but one point in the brain which makes us conscious of the same sensation at whatever
part of its course the primitive fibre may have been irritated. The reason why the sensation
appears to have its seat always in the skin, at whatever point of their length the nervous fibres
are irritated, seems to be, that the sensations are ordinarily produced by an action on the
skin, or on the cutaneous extremities of the fibres. (1:700/691)
So, stimulated location in the brain determines quality of sensation, and this quality is attributed to
the periphery merely as a matter of habit. This observation is then followed by a number of supporting
case studies, including especially those involving the phenomenon of “phantom pain” in amputated limbs
(1:705–707/694–696).
If all the evidence supports the conclusion that it is loci in the brain, not peripheral fibers, that
determine sensory quality, why does Mu¨ller continue to entertain the possibility that some property, or
“energy,” of the nerves themselves contributes to sensory quality? The key reason is purely historical, and
demonstrates Mu¨ller’s crucial position on the path toward functionalism. Mu¨ller was writing in the 1830’s,
shortly after the widespread rejection of phrenology by the broader scientific community. Phrenology is
a theory of functional localization within the brain, and as it was discredited, so also was the more
general theory. Mu¨ller himself explicitly rejects the phrenologist Gall’s localization of sexual drive in the
cerebellum (1:851–2/833–4), and more generally emphasizes the empirical inadequacy of phrenological
theories localizing the appetites (2:539/1369) or different activities of the mind (2:516–7/1345) in distinct
brain regions. Localization as a creditable hypothesis only began to reestablish itself a quarter century
after publication of the Handbuch, when Broca presented evidence in the 1860’s showing a correlation
between localized damage in the left frontal hemisphere and specific language deficits, followed by the
work of Fritsch and Hitzig on motor centers in the brain. So, Mu¨ller’s defense here of the possibility of
functional localization in the brain demonstrates both courage and foresight (see Boring 1950, pp. 88–9).
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3.2 Theoretical Conclusions
Laws V and VIII articulate the substantive theoretical conclusions of the Doctrine. These conclusions
combine the skeptical claim that we are only directly aware of the activity of our sensory nerves with
the realist one that we can nevertheless know facts about the world. On the traditional interpretation
(e.g. Boring 1950, pp. 87–8) our access to facts about the world rests upon the statistical prominence of
the adequate stimuli for each sense—our eyes are more likely to be stimulated by light than by pressure
or electricity. I argue, however, that Mu¨ller actually defends a stronger conclusion, namely our sensations
provide us with definitive structural information about the world, and it is of these structural relations
that we can have knowledge. This argument depends on reading Mu¨ller’s defense of Law VIII in light of
his general theory of epistemology.
V. Sensation consists in the transmission to consciousness [Bewustsein], not of a quality or
condition of an external body, but of a quality or condition of the sensory nerve, triggered by
an external cause, and these qualities are different in different nerves in accordance with their
particular energies. (2:254/1065*)
The most famous conclusion of the Doctrine is the claim that we are only directly aware (or conscious,
“Bewustsein”) of the conditions of our sensory nerves. Laws I–IV establish the double dissociation
between cause and sensation and the equivalence of internal and external causes for inducing sensations.
Law V goes beyond these causal claims to draw a skeptical conclusion about the information actually
received by experience: we do not experience external bodies, but rather qualities of our nerves. The
nature of these qualities is determined by the particular sense energy of the nerve involved. This follows
from the fact that the same stimulus applied to different sensory organs does not induce the same sensory
quality; since the vibration of a tuning fork induces a tickle, but no sound, when applied to the skin,
“something besides the vibrations must consequently be necessary for the production of the sensation of
sound, and that something is possessed by the auditory nerve alone” (2:256/1066).
Mu¨ller characterizes Law V as a rejection of the thesis that perception depends upon a “specific
irritability” (“specifischen Reizbarkeit”) of sensory nerves, i.e. the property of only being excited by
a particular quality in the world. As the double dissociation between cause and sensation shows, the
activation of a sensory nerve is not restricted to a unique, “adequate” stimulus. Nevertheless, Mu¨ller
acknowledges that senses are typically excited by a particular type of stimulus, and that this is a fact
relevant for understanding the physiology of sensation. Mu¨ller characterizes the relationship between
sensory organs and their typical stimuli as one of homogeneity (“homogen,” 2:255/1065*). The full import
of this notion of “homogeneity” is only revealed in Mu¨ller’s discussion of Law VIII. Before turning to that
Law, and Mu¨ller’s rejection of skepticism, we should examine the crucial methodological claim Mu¨ller
makes in the defense of Law V, a claim about the appropriate evidential foundations for a theory of
perception.
Criticisms of the Doctrine such as those of Bridges and Gibson can be understood as arguments about
which data are fundamental for the psychology of perception. For Gibson (and the gestalt psychologists),
organized patterns are to be taken as more fundamental than the individual sensory point-particulars
studied by Helmholtz and the early psychophysicists. These patterns supposedly convey information
about external objects, and have no corollaries in the artificially induced sensations studied by Mu¨ller
and his disciples. Bridges offers a variety of evolutionary and functional considerations in favor of the
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claim that only sensations induced by adequate stimuli constitute fundamental data for the study of
perception. Neither Bridges nor Gibson denies the phenomena Mu¨lller identifies in the first four Laws,
nor that they demand some kind of explanation; they deny that these phenomena constitute the starting
point from which to construct a theory of perception.
In his defense of Law V, Mu¨ller makes clear where he differs. In particular, he insists on the primacy
of phenomena originally recognized as merely “subjective,” and thus irrelevant to a theory of perception.
These “subjective” phenomena are sensations generated by inadequate stimuli, or by adequate proximal
stimuli which do not reflect invariants in the distal stimuli, and for Mu¨ller they form the fundamental
data for both physiology and psychology of perception. In particular, the need for specific sense energies
rather than specific irritability:
. . . has been rendered more and more evident in recent times by the investigation of the so-
called “subjective” phenomena of the senses by Elliot, Darwin, Ritter, Goethe, Purkinje,
and Hjort. Those phenomena of the senses, namely, are now styled “subjective,” which
are produced, not by the usual stimulus homogeneous with the particular nerve of sense,
but by others which do not usually act upon it. These important phenomena were long
spoken of as “illusions of the senses” [Sinnesta¨uschungen] and have been disregarded in an
erroneous point of view; while they are really true actions of the senses [Sinneswahrheiten],
and must be studied as fundamental phenomena [Grundpha¨nomene] in the analysis of the
senses. (2:255/1065*)
In Laws I–IV, Mu¨ller provides evidence for the double dissociation of sensation from cause in terms
of the outcomes of experiments. Here, however, he emphasizes the figures whose astute observations
of phenomena served as the starting point for experimentation and theoretical progress in the study of
sensation. For example, R. W. Darwin (1786) begins from a careful description and classification of
afterimages, that then motivates substantive theses about the physiology of the retina. This theoretical
progress is only possible on the interpretation that “the retina is in an active not a passive state during
the existence of these ocular spectra [afterimages]; and it is thence to be concluded, that all vision is
owing to the activity of this organ” (314). The power of this explanatory assumption is demonstrated
through the numerous analogies with well-known phenomena in other sensory modalities Darwin makes
throughout his monograph; for instance the change in sensibility induced by staring at a fixed stimulus
(e.g. a square of white paper on a black background) is compared to temperature adaptation, our inability
to hear faint sounds immediately after exposure to loud ones, and even the tendency toward indigestion
in those who have habituated their digestive organs to strong liquor (319–320). “Subjective” phenomena
here provide the motivation and justification for substantive theoretical development.13
It is a matter of historical record that the “subjective” data Mu¨ller cites have been instrumental in the
development of our understanding of the physiology of sensation. Gibson and Bridges might, however,
grant this point while nevertheless insisting that they are not relevant for grounding the psychology
13J. W. Ritter reported his sensations upon stimulating all five sensory organs with electricity from a Voltaic pile in the
early 19th century. Goethe’s (1810) monograph on color, though theoretically misguided, collected an enormous number
of careful phenomenological observations of color spreading, afterimages, and adaptation and contrast effects. Purkinje
(1825) noted that colors in the blue-green range are relatively darker than those in the red-yellow range in bright daylight,
but this relationship is reversed, and blue-green colors appear relatively brighter, at dusk. This careful observation was
instrumental in driving research on dark-adaptation, scotopic vision, and the spectral sensitivity of rod cells; the “Purkinje
Shift” continues to be cited in contemporary textbooks on both vision in particular and sensation in general.
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or epistemology of sensation. I take it this issue turns on the question of whether the methods of
psychology presuppose that “subjective” phenomena have the same evidential status as phenomena due
to adequate stimuli. If they do, then Mu¨ller’s assertion that they constitute fundamental data for the
study of sensation in general would seem to be correct, and consequently any naturalistic epistemology
of sensation would need to accept them as fundamental as well. Part II defends this position.
Mu¨ller concludes his defense of Law V with a reiteration of his skeptical conclusion that foreshadows
the positive account of sensory knowledge in Law VIII:
[T]he sensory nerves are not mere conductors of the properties of bodies to our sensorium,
and . . . we are informed about objects outside of us only through the properties of our nerves
and their susceptibility to be modified more or less strongly by outer objects. Even the tactile
sensation of our hand does not in the first instance convey the surface state of the touched
body to intuition [Anschauung ], but merely those spots of our body which are excited by
the touching. Representation [Vorstellung ] and judgment [Urtheil ] turn the simple sensation
into something completely different.. . . Here we can also see why sensory knowledge [sinnliche
Erkenntniss] can never unlock for us the nature and essence of the sensible world [sinnlichen
Welt ]. We constantly sense ourselves in interaction with the sensible outer world, thereby
creating representations of the configuration [Beschaffenheit ] of outer objects, which may
have a relative correctness [relative Richtigkeit ], but which never bring the nature of the
bodies themselves to that immediate intuition [umittelbare Anschauung ] by which the states
of our body parts reach the sensorium. (2:258/1069*)
Mu¨ller articulates here a theory of indirect perception on which representations formed by judgments
correspond to (configurations of) bodies in the world, but the essential natures of those bodies are
forever opaque, corresponding in no way to the simple sensations from which these representations are
derived. Nevertheless, these representations may have a “relative correctness” and, as we know from
Section 2, juxtapositions of similarly structured representations generate knowledge about the external
world, a conclusion elaborated in Law VIII.
VIII. Although the sensory nerves feel in the first instance only their own states, or the
sensorium feels the states of the sensory nerves, inasmuch as the sensory nerves are material
bodies, and therefore participate in the properties of matter generally, occupying space, being
susceptible of vibratory motion, and capable of being changed chemically as well as by the
action of heat and electricity, they indicate [zeigen] to the sensorium, by virtue of the changes
thus produced in them by external causes, not merely their own states, but also properties
[Eigenschaften] and changes of condition [Vera¨nderungen] of the external world, in each sense
via the particular quality or energy particular to it. (2:262/1073*)
Law VIII is the philosophical core of the Doctrine. Although the first clause reiterates the skeptical
conclusion of Law V, the remainder characterizes the perceptual origins of our knowledge of the external
world. There are two steps in this account: the relationship between sensory organs and the physical
world; and the process by which external “properties and changes of condition” are successfully “indi-
cated” despite our indirect access to them. This first step elaborates on the claim of “homogeneity”
between sense organ and adequate stimulus; the second step, when viewed through the lens of Mu¨ller’s
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epistemology, resolves the apparent tension in the claim that the senses cannot directly access external
properties, yet nevertheless convey changes in these properties with “relative correctness.”
Our sensory organs are connected to the physical world insofar as they are made of matter and share
properties with other matter. Here is where we can make sense of the notion of homogeneity Mu¨ller
invokes in Law V. The structure of a sensory organ facilitates interactions with certain types of external
cause in virtue of the manner in which it interacts with them physically, as a body with other bodies.
Why does light stimulate the eye, but sound stimulate the ear? The eye is structured to focus and respond
to light; there is a chain of interactions from light source, through intervening medium, to surface, again
through intervening medium, through lens of eye, through medium of the vitreous humor, to receptors at
the retina. This chain of interactions is causally homogeneous: each stage involves the same type of causal
process, the transmission of light. Likewise, the ear is structured to amplify and respond to vibrations in
the air, and there is a chain of interactions from initial vibratory source, reflections off surfaces, through
an intervening medium, until the vibrations impinge on the ear drum, and are transferred via the ossicles
to receptors in the cochlea. This chain of interactions is also causally homogeneous, each interaction
being of the same causal type, yet the causal type involved is not the same as that manifest in the chain
of causal interactions which typically passes through the eye.
If this analysis of Mu¨ller’s view is correct, it takes us halfway toward a form of perceptual realism.
For the skeptical results of the first five Laws are a consequence of a feature of all nerves (motor as well
as sensory): they may be excited in a variety of ways, but once they are excited they always produce
the same result. However, our typical sensory experience is mediated by our sensory organs, and these
organs, being causally homogeneous with aspects of the material world, are suited to convey to us veridical
features of that world. Nevertheless, the type of sensory experience associated with a sensory modality
cannot directly convey the type of external cause which induced it, so we cannot obtain knowledge
about properties in the world by considering the qualitative character of our sensations. What aspect of
sensation then is suited to convey knowledge about the world?
Here is where Mu¨ller’s epistemology explains a puzzling feature of his defense of Law VIII. After listing
those features of material bodies to which sensory organs are susceptible (occupying space, influence by
vibratory motion, chemical change), Mu¨ller proceeds to show for each one of these material interactions
how it may affect multiple sensory organs. Notice that on the traditional reading of Mu¨ller’s realism, this
makes no sense: if our knowledge of the world follows from the statistical prominence of the adequate
stimuli in interacting with our sense organs, then Mu¨ller should present an argument that it really is, say,
light which stimulates our eyes more frequently than pressure, electricity, etc. Instead, however, Mu¨ller
takes care to demonstrate for each type of physical interaction he lists that multiple sensory modalities
are affected by it, and takes this demonstration to constitute evidence that “extension, progressive and
tremulous motion, and chemical change” are “properties which may be completely determined from the
outside” (2:262/1073*).
This strategy makes perfect sense in light of Mu¨ller’s epistemology, however. If knowledge resides
in abstractions from similarities across multiple ideas, then showing there are similarities in patterns of
sensation across multiple sensory modalities supports the conclusion that these similarities themselves
constitute knowledge. In the case of extension, for instance,
Although the senses of vision, touch, and taste are all capable of sensing the property of
extension in space, yet the quality of the sensations which give the sensation of extension is
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different in each of these senses; the sensation in one is an image of which the essential quality
is light; in another, a perception of extension with any of the modifications of the quality of
touch, between pain, cold, heat, and pleasure; in the third, a perception of extension with the
quality of taste. (2:263/1074*)
Extension, comprising spatial relations between qualities, is a structural property, which may be veridi-
cally detected through the activation of different sensory qualities across different organs of sense. As
such, it does not matter for our knowledge of the world that our primitive sensory experiences only convey
information about states of our nerves. For in interactions between these primitive sensory qualities, a
structural whole emerges that is independent of the nature of those qualities themselves. Patterns of
color and patterns of pressure may both convey that very same property of the world, extension.
Mu¨ller employs this same strategy to argue for our ability to veridically detect motion and chemical
change. Vibratory motion is detected most obviously by audition and touch, though Mu¨ller also discusses
the detection of vibrations through vision. Chemical changes are detected by taste, smell, and touch.
Mu¨ller always leaves open the possibility that these properties may be detected by other senses. In fact, it
is this very feature that ensures they are not mere artifacts of our perceptual system, but true properties
of the world. For if extension, vibratory motion, and chemical change are actual properties of the world,
then we should be able to detect them with multiple sensory organs: this is the positive content of the
double dissociation between sensation and external cause—since our sensory organs can interact with
heterogeneous causes in the world, they can detect invariant patterns in the world that are independent
of the particular chain of causal influence leading to that organ.
The properties discussed by Mu¨ller here appear to roughly follow the traditional primary / secondary
quality distinction. Color, taste, odor, etc. are typically identified as secondary qualities, our experience
of which differs qualitatively from their instantiation in the world, whereas motion and extension are
typical primary qualities, true qualities of the world veridically perceived by us as they are (and, on early
modern accounts, themselves causally responsible somehow for our experience of secondary qualities).
Yet Mu¨ller’s motivation for this distinction is radically different from that of Descartes, Galileo, Boyle, or
Locke. It is not the conceptual clarity of our understanding of the nature of extension, nor the legitimacy
for or explanatory role of extension in science which gives it its privileged status. Rather, the distinctive
feature of extension is just that it can be sensed in multiple sensory modalities. From this perspective,
Mu¨ller’s distinction is much closer to that between the special and common sensible qualities in Aristotle.
For Aristotle, there is a distinctive set of special sensible qualities associated with each of the five sensory
modalities (colors for vision; odors for olfaction; etc.). Properties such as movement, size, and number
are distinguished from these in that they can be detected across any sensory modality.
These considerations shed light on Mu¨ller’s handling of the Molyneux / Locke problem: would a person
blind from birth, familiar with triangles and circles as sensed via touch, be able to distinguish triangles
and circles via vision if suddenly granted the ability to see? Mu¨ller finds it “difficult to comprehend” how
Molyneux and Locke might have answered this question in the negative (2:362/1176*). Yet this is not
because he considers our concept of spatiality innate, as discussed in Footnote 7. Rather, spatiality is
commonly sensed across different sensory modalities. The process of abstracting triangular and circular
shape concepts from tactile experience is just the process of obscuring the particular qualities of individual
pressures from which they are derived. Thus, when triangles and circles are seen for the first time, there
is no problem of re-identifying them without their tactile component. Rather these new impressions are
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just instances of the very same concepts, and having already been formed, these spatial concepts now
bind the understanding and perception of their visual instances (cf. 2:271/1082).
Finally, this reading of Mu¨ller’s realism, on which structural relations between external properties may
be sensed, even as the natures of primitive physical properties are forever hidden from us, reveals a deep
continuity with his arch-critic Gibson. Gibson’s alternative to the focus on particular point sensations
he saw in Mu¨ller and Helmholtz was to emphasize the informational role of dynamic patterns in the
stimulus, such as the “optic flow” one experiences while moving through an environment (1986, 121–5).
Yet Mu¨ller seems to presage this exact idea in suggestive passages such as this:
[W]ith every movement of our body, with every step forwards, the forms of the images [on our
retina] undergo a change, the remote become near, and the near objects present other surfaces
to our view. This change in the images depicted on our retina during the locomotion of our
body, must convey to the mind the idea of our moving in space between the different images,—
of our advancing through the midst of them; for, during this locomotion, the image of our
own body in the field of vision becomes constantly associated with new images of external
objects, and the locomotion is the cause of this displacement of the images. (2:272/1084)
Like Gibson, Mu¨ller recognizes the importance of change, systematic relations between successive states
of a sense organ, for conveying information about the world. Their true locus of disagreement, then,
is only on the methodological question whether these patterns of change themselves or the primitive
qualities they comprise constitute the foundational evidence for a science of perception. These points of
agreement and debate are pursued further in Part II.
3.3 Conjectures
The last two laws of Mu¨ller’s Doctrine address familiar features of perceptual experience at prime fa-
cie odds with the fundamental conclusions of Laws V and VIII. Unlike previous laws, however, the
justification provided appeals neither to empirical results nor methodological principles; rather, Mu¨ller
constructs “just so” stories to demonstrate how these familiar features might be recovered despite his
previous conclusions.
IX. That sensations are referred from their proper seat towards the exterior, is owing, not to
anything in the nature of the nerves themselves, but to the accompanying idea derived from
experience. (2:268/1080)
The most serious phenomenological challenge to the Doctrine is our attribution of sensed properties
to an objective external world. Redness does not appear intuitively to be a property of my eyes, but
rather of the surfaces of distant objects; how does this appearance arise if we only directly perceive states
of our nerves? Mu¨ller focuses here on spatiality, and constructs a narrative on which the “percipient
conscious subject” gradually comes to attribute properties it experiences to the “external world” with
which it is “brought into collision.” This process begins in the womb, as the child experiences resistance
to its motions, and comes to categorize these forms of resistance as of two types: those originating with
itself, as when one hand touches another; and those which originate outside itself, as when its hand
touches the wall of the womb. These interactions inspire two notions of externality from the self, first the
body external to the self, whose movements are nevertheless controllable, next the world external to the
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body, distinguished by its being uncontrollable. Mu¨ller acknowledges at the outset, however, that it is
“impossible” to have “a full recollection of the first impressions made upon [our senses] independently of
the ideas obtained through their means.” Thus, his theory of the process by which we come to externalize
our sensations is not an empirical result, but a conceptual analysis of “the act of sensation” (2:268/1080).
It is difficult to interpret Law IX as anything other than mere conjecture, but one might worry that
conjecture here is not enough, that our attribution of sensed properties to distal objects is of fundamental
epistemic import, taking precedence over even the empirical arguments of the first eight laws (see Part
II for further discussion of this line of reasoning). Mu¨ller, however, seems to regard our attribution of
properties to external objects as so easily defeasible that it does not warrant privileged consideration:
If we lay our hand upon a table, we become conscious, on a little reflection, that we do not
feel the table, but merely that part of our skin which the table touches; but, without this
reflection, we confound the sensation of the part of the skin which has received the impression
with the idea of the resistance, and we maintain boldly that we feel the table itself, which is
not the case. (2:269–70/1081)
Whether or not we agree with Mu¨ller that our tendency to externalize sensed properties can so easily be
disregarded “on a little reflection,” it is clear from Mu¨ller’s discussion that the conclusions of Laws V and
VIII are not meant to stand or fall with the plausibility of his account of this externalization. Rather,
we should assess the arguments for the fundamental conclusions of the Doctrine on their own evidential
and methodological merits.
X. The mind not only perceives the sensations and interprets them according to ideas pre-
viously obtained, but it has a direct influence on them, imparting to them intensity. This
influence of the mind, in the case of the senses which have the power of distinguishing the
property of extension in objects, may be confined to definite parts of the sentient organ; in the
sense gifted with the power of distinguishing with delicacy intervals of time, it may be confined
to particular acts of sensation. It also has the power of giving to one sense a predominant
activity. (2:272/1084)
Mu¨ller ends the Doctrine with a catalog of examples of the effect of attention on sensory experience.
Sometimes, although our senses are functioning, sensory experience is not communicated to consciousness
(not noticed or remembered) because our attention is turned inward to some other idea. When one sense
is absent, greater amounts of attention can be distributed amongst those which remain, as in a blind
man’s heightened ability to discriminate surface properties through touch. By focusing our attention on
particular sounds, we may distinguish one instrument amongst many in an orchestra performance. Mu¨ller
also considers phenomena of binocular rivalry to demonstrate shifts in attention, as when looking at a
white surface through differently colored, blue and yellow, spectacles produces alternating experiences of
blue spots upon a yellow field and yellow spots upon a blue field (2:274/1086).
However, to say that they are instances of attention does not actually explain any of these examples.
Nor are the examples themselves, with the exception of binocular rivalry, recondite discoveries of the
lab, but merely sensitively described everyday phenomena. Unlike the inductive generalizations, this is
not a systematization of experimental results, but a set of conjectures in need of empirical investigation.
While thought-provoking, these conjectures do not themselves play any significant evidentiary role in
establishing the substantive conclusions of the Doctrine.
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4 Conclusion: Mu¨ller’s Structural Realism
Mu¨ller’s Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies asserts that we perceive in the first instance the states
of our nerves, that we cannot know the primitive properties of the world, but that we can veridically
conceptualize relations that hold between properties in the world, namely higher-order features such as
spatial extension, motion, and chemical change. In contemporary parlance, this is a form of epistemic
structural realism: all we can know about the world is its structure.
Structural realism is not at present a common view in the epistemology of perception,14 but it has
wide-ranging support in philosophy of science. Mu¨ller himself is committed to structural realism as a
general epistemological position, subsuming the knowledge claims of both perception and science, in
part due to his Herbartian theory of concept formation through abstraction. However, his argument
to the skeptical conclusion of the Doctrine, that we perceive in the first instance the activity of our
nerves, rests only on a combination of empirical results and three methodological principles: the unitary
correspondence principle, the principle of comparability, and the principle that subjective phenomena
are foundational for the study of perception. If these methodological principles are endorsed by current
perceptual science, then the arguments of the Doctrine remain valid, and any naturalistic philosophy of
perception must accept its skeptical conclusion.
Part II pursues this line of thought and argues for the continued relevance of the Doctrine today.
Mu¨ller’s three methodological principles have indeed been validated and entrenched in the contemporary
science of perception; consequently, naturalistic philosophers of perception must confront the Doctrine’s
skeptical challenge. I argue that the most promising response to this challenge is essentially Mu¨ller’s
own: epistemic structural realism. While contemporary philosophers and psychologists may not endorse
Mu¨ller’s theory of concept formation, they may still take inspiration from his vision of physiology, psy-
chology, and philosophy as three intertwined endeavors, mutually advancing and supporting each other: a
syncretic perspective that leads to structuralism. Mu¨ller’s Doctrine also remains relevant for the history
of philosophy of science, for his structuralism inspired that of Helmholtz, which in turn influenced the
various structuralisms of Hertz, Cassirer, and Schlick, thereby shaping in part the project of the Vienna
Circle. The question of the Doctrine’s significance for contemporary philosophy of science is more murky,
however, as it no longer recognizes the close analogy between the epistemological problems of science and
perception that so moved Mu¨ller and his early followers.
Concluding Part I, I hope to have demonstrated that Mu¨ller’s own understanding of the Doctrine
of Specific Nerve Energies was considerably more subtle than that attributed to him by critics and
supporters alike; that his arguments exemplify his commitment to a philosophical physiology, informing
and informed by psychology; and that his epistemic structural realism is both intrinsically interesting,
and of potential inspiration for contemporary philosophy.
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